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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 6356

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 146856

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TAGS: [PTER](#) [ASEC](#) [EFIN](#) [KCRM](#) [PTER](#) [KHLS](#) [AEMR](#)

SUBJECT: 2007:COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

REF: STATE 145633

NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION.

¶1. This message provides preparation guidance for preparing the 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT).

¶2. We recommend that "Country Reports on Terrorism 2006" be the starting point for this year's exercise. Per reftel, the Department requests that posts draft narrative submissions, as opposed to the itemized format used through 2005, and that you post submissions on intellipedia. Three examples of the kind of reporting we seek are in paragraph 12.

¶3. Per reftel, for the 2007 CRT, we will not/not accept Post submissions in the itemized format. Please note the proper URL for setting up your passport account is: <https://passport.csp.sgov.gov/passport/servlet/Passport>. (In reftel, "gov" was misspelled as "goli". We regret any confusion this may have caused.)

¶4. Posts' submissions must be UNCLASSIFIED. Although the Department is authorized to provide a separate classified supplement to its report to Congress, past reports were unclassified. If posts find it necessary or useful to

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provide classified information or commentary, they should classify such material separately by paragraph.

¶5. Each post is requested to report major political developments or changes likely to have an impact on the ability of terrorists to attack or operate in the relevant country, including using it as a safe haven. We also ask you to report changes or trends that emerge when comparing local developments in terrorism/counterterrorism in 2007 versus 2006.

¶6. Submissions are due NLT December 21. Since the report covers calendar year 2007, any significant developments occurring after post submission should be addressed in an addendum for submission during the first three weeks of 2008. Please note that The Department must transmit the 2007 report to Congress by April 28, 2008. Given the necessary clearance and coordination processes, the inflexible printing schedule, and the short lead time between the end of the calendar year and the April 30 deadline for submission to Congress, we are under strict time constraints to incorporate your contributions into a product that is the definitive USG public document on international terrorism.

¶7. Please note that 2007 preparation instructions for the Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT), with any necessary updates, are available on Intellipedia-S on CLASSNet as part at the following link:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Country_Reports_on_Terrorism_2007_Preparation_Instructions. These instructions are also on the unclassified State Department intranet site: <http://intranet.state.gov>, at the Directory tab under the heading "Related Resources". Instructions include:

- (a) legislation and mandated requirements;
- (b) a 2007 CRT requirements checklist;
- (c) style guidelines (voice, spelling, transitional language, etc.) We urge you to review these guidelines, because we can lose hours of time on continuity issues, such as the spelling of al-Qaida, Hizballah, counterterrorism (one word), and safe haven (two words).

¶8. The Department will depend on posts' contributions to meet our requirements and will also work closely with the National Counterterrorism Center to compile all requested information. We ask Posts to consider four distinct (but sometimes overlapping) categories of information:

- General Assessment
- Sanctuary (Safe Havens) Assessment
- Terrorist Groups
- Foreign Government Cooperation

Each post should review the description of each category of information below to determine if last year's report requires updating.

¶9. GENERAL ASSESSMENT. The annual Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT) is required to include detailed

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assessments on each foreign country (a) in which acts of international terrorism of major significance occurred; (b) that is currently designated as a state sponsor of terrorism (Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria); or (c) that is otherwise determined by the Secretary to be subject to the report.

(SBU/NOFORN) This should include:

--A review of the country's major counterterrorism efforts. An analysis of trends in international terrorism in each country, including changes in the technology terrorists used, methods and targets of attack, demographic information on terrorists, and other appropriate information.

Only leadership steps taken in international fora need be included. We include a matrix of which countries are signatories to the thirteen international agreements and protocols, so this information need not be included in Post submission.

-- The response of the judicial system in each country relating to terrorism affecting U.S. citizens or facilities that have a significant impact on U.S. counterterrorism efforts, including responses to extradition requests.

-- Significant support, if any, for international terrorism, and particularly to specific terrorist or umbrella groups, to include:

- a. political and financial support;
- b. diplomatic support through diplomatic recognition and diplomatic privileges;
- c. providing safe haven to terrorists or terrorist groups

(i.e., groups actively engaged in international terrorism);
d. providing weapons of mass destruction, or assistance in obtaining or developing such weapons, to terrorists or terrorist groups;
e. positions (such as voting records) on matters relating to terrorism in the UNGA and other international bodies.

¶10. SAFE HAVEN ASSESSMENTS. Please include detailed assessments with respect to each foreign country being used as a safe haven for terrorists or terrorist organizations. These assessments should include:

-- The extent of knowledge by the government of the country with respect to terrorist activities on the territory of the country.

-- The actions of the country:

- a. to eliminate any terrorist safe haven in its territory,
- b. to cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and
- c. to prevent the proliferation of and trafficking in WMD in and through the territory of the country.

Note: If safe haven does not apply to your country, there is no need to state that.

¶11. INFORMATION ON TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. This information should be updated in Chapter 6, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations." This information could be referenced, but not repeated, in your country narrative.

¶12. Please include information about activities that occurred in 2007 of any terrorist group (i.e., any group actively practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism) and any umbrella group that is:

- a. known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of a U.S. citizen during the preceding five years;
- b. known to have obtained or developed, or to have attempted to obtain or develop, weapons of mass destruction;
- c. known to be financed by a designated state sponsor of terrorism;
- d. a designated foreign terrorist organization; or
- e. a known terrorist group which the Secretary of State believes should be included in the report.
- f. Posts are invited to offer assessments of additional groups they may recommend be subject to the report; where appropriate we will make recommendations to S.

¶13. In the case of State Sponsors of Terrorism (Cuba, Iran, Syria, Sudan, and North Korea), this information should include:

-- Significant financial support provided by foreign

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governments to those groups directly, or provided in support of their activities;

-- Provisions of significant military or paramilitary training or transfer of weapons by foreign governments to those groups;

-- Provision of diplomatic recognition or privileges by foreign governments to those groups;

-- Provision by foreign governments of safe haven from prosecution to these groups or their members responsible for the commission, attempt, or planning of an act of international terrorism;

¶14. INFORMATION ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENT COOPERATION. The CRT should also include the following information concerning each foreign country that the U.S. has sought

cooperation during the previous five years in the investigation or prosecution of an act of international terrorism against U.S. citizens or interests:

-- The extent to which the government of the country is cooperating in apprehending, convicting, and punishing the individual(s) responsible for the act.

--The extent to which the government of the country is cooperating to prevent further acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens in the country. (This information should also be provided with respect to any foreign country from whom the U.S. has sought cooperation in the previous five years in the prevention of an act of international terrorism against U.S. citizens or interests.)

¶15. Posts should also include important follow-up information to major developments from prior years that continued into 2005, including resolution or continuation of terrorist prosecutions for acts committed in prior reporting years.

¶16. It is important for all posts to draw a distinction between host government actions aimed at suppressing terrorist activity and those aimed at suppressing legitimate political opposition or dissent. Posts should also comment on the counterterrorism efforts of relevant regional organizations and groupings for which they may be responsible (e.g. OSCE, ASEAN, GCC, and others).

¶17. We provide the 2006 reports of Uzbekistan, the United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia as possible templates of the kind of reporting we seek:

a. Uzbekistan

There remained a clear potential for Islamic extremism and acts of international terrorism in Uzbekistan. Supporters of terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), were active in the region. Members of these groups expressed anti-U.S. sentiments and have attacked U.S. interests in the past, including a 2004 suicide bombing at the U.S. embassy in Tashkent, which was claimed by the Islamic Jihad Group (IJU), now the IJU. U.S. Government personnel and facilities continued to operate at a heightened state of alert.

The Government of Uzbekistan did not provide safe haven for terrorists or terrorist organizations. However, the country's poor economic climate and repressive government policies created conditions in which large portions of the population were increasingly susceptible to extremist ideologies. Uzbekistan's porous borders, particularly in the Ferghana Valley, allowed for people and illicit goods to move in and out of the country with relative freedom. The government responded to these threats with even more repressive actions against regime opponents and those it deemed to be religious extremists. However, it failed to address the conditions terrorists might exploit to gain popular support and recruits for their cause. Although Uzbekistan was among the first states to support U.S. efforts in the War on Terror, the Government of Uzbekistan ended virtually all counterterrorism cooperation with the United States in mid-2005. In November 2005, the United States fully vacated, at Uzbekistan's request, the Karshi-Khanabad airbase. Authorization for U.S. aircraft to overfly Uzbekistani territory ended in January 2006, although an agreement was signed in November allowing Department of Defense-contracted civilian aircraft to overfly Uzbekistan on a fee-per-flight basis. Tashkent hosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) Regional Antiterrorism Center Secretariat (RATS), which claimed to have begun to focus on operational activities such as developing a coordinated list of

terrorist groups and facilitating joint counterterrorism exercises among SCO member states. In the past, the government participated in UNODC and OSCE programs aimed at ensuring that it enacted appropriate terrorism legislation. However, Uzbekistani participation in these programs has virtually ended, and the government has made little progress in this regard.

b. United Kingdom

There were no successful terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom in 2006. In August, British, Pakistani, and American officials worked together to disrupt a terror plot involving British citizens intent on detonating aircraft traveling between the United Kingdom and the United States. The British government arrested over 20 individuals suspected of being involved in that plot, many of whom were subsequently charged with criminal acts and intent to carry out acts of terrorism. Their cases remained before the courts. Some of those arrested had spent time in or had ties to Pakistan. The British and American governments instituted new restrictions to transatlantic airline travel in response to the revealed airline plot. The United States and United Kingdom enjoyed a wide-range of bilateral information sharing on threat assessments and terror networks, and government responses to both. Cooperation in derailing the transatlantic terror plot in August was evidence of the ability of the two governments to work together, in real-time, to avert loss of life from terrorism.

The British government acknowledged the existence of some 200 known terror networks in the United Kingdom. In November, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, head of the domestic security service (known as MI5), made a stark announcement that there were some "1,600" individuals, "200 networks," and an estimated "30 terror plots" in the United Kingdom. The British government viewed radicalization of young people in the U.K. and elsewhere, regardless of whether those radicalized in the U.K. had ties to AQ or are "homegrown," as a growing threat to international and British security.

The government enacted new counterterrorism legislation that made the "glorification of terrorism" illegal, and expanded the government's ability to detain terror suspects before charging them. The government has a mechanism for deporting foreign terror suspects to their home countries once those countries agreed to provide assurances that the suspects' human rights will not be violated upon their return. The courts tried and convicted several prominent terror suspects involved in terror plots prior to 2006. The British government also increased its efforts at outreach to Muslim communities within the U.K. It sought to support advocates of moderate interpretations of Islam and to gain support from within British Muslim communities to counter the appeal of extremist ideology and radicalization.

The United States and the U.K. worked closely within the UN and the FATF to deny terrorists and their supporters access to the international financial system. The United Kingdom had strong legal provisions for freezing assets related to terrorist financing, including the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2001, the al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2001, and the Antiterrorism Crime and Security Act 2001. In October, the British government took measures to further strengthen its terrorist financing legislation when Chancellor Gordon Brown announced that Her Majesty's Treasury, on the advice of law enforcement agencies, had agreed to use "closed source evidence" (classified materials) in asset freezing cases where there were strong operational reasons to impose a freeze but insufficient unclassified information available. He also announced that the government would seek to amend its existing domestic legislation to give "the Treasury the power to stop funds reaching anyone in the U.K. suspected of planning terror or engaging with terror."

c. Saudi Arabia

The Government of Saudi Arabia continued to experience a mix of successes and setbacks in its efforts to combat terrorism. Government security forces conducted successful

operations against terrorist cells, capturing or killing large numbers of wanted terrorist suspects, as well as members of their support networks. The government has made some progress in other aspects of its counterterrorism effort, such as financing and education, but it still has significant ground to cover to address these issues. Saudi efforts suffered setbacks with prison breaks and an attack that led to the discovery of extensive support networks in the Kingdom. Prison escapes occurred in March at the al-Kharj prison and in July from al-Malaz jail in Riyadh. On February 24, a Saudi-based AQ cell conducted a suicide attack utilizing vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices on Saudi Aramco's Abqaiq oil stabilization and processing facility near Dammam, which

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resulted in the death of two security guards and several of the bombers. Saudi security forces achieved several successes, both in response to these attacks and independently of them. Saudi security forces killed or captured all of the members of the Abqaiq cell and all but three of the Maraz prison escapees. On August 21, five wanted terrorists surrendered in response to government assurances in the media that they would receive mitigated sentences. In December, the government announced the capture during the previous three months of 136 suspected terrorists who were involved in terrorist support networks in the Kingdom. The Saudi government initiated several programs to support its counterterrorism efforts and bolster its campaign against extremists. King Abdullah created a special security court, the Court of the Divergent, to prosecute terrorist suspects. Interior Minister Prince Nayif gave public assurances that the Court would not be a military tribunal, but would conform to existing judicial practices and law. Additionally, the government began planning a border security system, including fences and sensors, to prevent infiltration of terrorists or terrorist funding into the kingdom. In December, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit reiterated its calls to criminalize terrorism, and called for a comprehensive effort against terrorism to include intellectual, social, and educational efforts. The Saudi government moved to monitor and enforce its anti-money laundering and terrorist finance laws, regulations, and guidelines. However, it still had not established a High Commission for Charities. As in many countries in the Middle East, there was still an over-reliance on suspicious transaction reporting to generate money laundering investigations. Saudi Arabia's unwillingness to publicly disseminate statistics regarding money laundering prosecutions impeded the evaluation and design of enhancements to the judicial aspects of its anti-money laundering system. The Saudi government did not subject Saudi international charities to the same government oversight as domestic charities. In August, the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee designated the International Islamic Relief Organization's (IIRO) branches in Indonesia and the Philippines, and the Kingdom's Eastern Province Branch Director, Abdulhamid Al-Mujil. In late 2005, the government enacted stricter regulations on the cross-border movement of money and precious metals. Money and gold in excess of \$16,000 must be declared upon entry and exit from the country. While the regulations were effective immediately, Customs has not issued new cash declaration forms, and therefore has not yet been able to enforce the current regulation. In the cultural arena, official visits by a number of U.S. officials, including Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom John Hanford, highlighted the government's efforts to remove references in textbooks that called for violence against non-Muslims and Muslims of different sects. The government also initiated the National Campaign to Counter Terrorism, which included publications, lectures, and workshops intended to educate school-age girls and boys about the evils of terrorism. To promote tolerance, the

government began revising curricula and teaching methods, screening and reevaluating existing teachers, improving selection of future teachers, and better monitoring of teachers.

The government continued to require religious leaders to attend courses designed to eradicate extremist ideology in the mosques and monitor mosque sermons to promote tolerance and eliminate extremism. Several religious leaders were fired or subjected to punitive actions for failure to abide by government instructions to avoid provocative speeches against non-Muslims and non-Sunni Muslims. In previous years in some mosques, a second preacher would appear after the main preacher during the Friday prayer and speak provocatively against Jews, Americans, or non-orthodox Muslims. This practice is less prevalent now, due in large part to the government's efforts to combat extremism in the mosques.

The Saudi government remained engaged in its efforts to root out terrorists and their support networks in the Kingdom, but continued to face difficulties in combating the appeal of AQ ideology. Despite significant efforts and successes in the counterterrorism realm, Saudi security forces continued to discover new terrorist networks in the Kingdom. The Saudi government will need to further address the social and religious underpinnings that sustain the Saudi form of Islamic extremism.

¶18. Department greatly appreciates the volume of work that goes into post contributions to this effort. S/CT is prepared to respond to any and all questions posts may have to assist in preparing their contributions. Please forward all questions to S/CT Rhonda Shore at

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shorerh@state.sgov.gov. We are confident that thanks to the information to be provided by posts, this year's Country Reports on Terrorism will be the best effort yet to explain the continuing threat.

¶19. Minimize considered.

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